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 First of all, I would like to express my impression that, as long as I know as a researcher who is somehow 
interested in Hume’s philosophy, Professor Beebee’s understanding on Hume’s argument of causation is quite 
unique and stimulating indeed. Looking back at the history of Hume study, we easily find that Hume was initial-
ly understood to be a philosopher of scepticism （perhaps because of the influence of Thomas Reid’s interpreta-
tion of Hume）. However, this traditional interpretation was dramatically changed by Norman Kemp Smith, who 
delineates Hume as a philosopher of naturalism rather than scepticism. According to the naturalistic reading of 
Hume, Hume is supposed to develop his arguments in the following way; It is true that we might have to fall 
into a kind of scepticism at the theoretical level if we seriously and reasonably carry out philosophical scrutiny 
about our perceptions, nevertheless （or, correctly speaking, in contrast to sceptical consequences that we must 
fall into at the theoretical level） we come to recognize freshly at the practical level that we actually continue 
to live our real lives every day, thus philosophers must face this fact （abandoning sceptical consequences） and 
clarify how we lead our everyday lives by taking our function of imagination （that is, human nature） into ac-
count. This naturalistic view of Kemp Smith has been dominant over Hume scholars, even if how to evaluate 
Hume’s sceptical arguments depends on each scholar. Of course, Hume’s naturalism as Kemp Smith highlights 
is distinctly different from current naturalism of epistemology as Quine once introduced; in that Humean natu-
ralism focuses upon human nature whereas Quinean one tries to equate epistemology to natural science. Human 
nature is not necessarily the same as natural science. However, there is one common feature to both naturalism 
of Hume and Quine. That is to say, broadly speaking, they share the key idea that philosophy （particularly of 
knowledge） should be engaged in the task of DESCRIBING how our knowledge is generated rather than NOR-
MATIVELY or rationally justifying our knowledge. Thus, as far as I understand, a core characteristic to be 
positively emphasized of Hume’s philosophy consists in his basic strategy to simply describe generation of our 
knowledge or belief without taking the problem of justification seriously. I myself mostly agree with this cur-
rent, dominant, naturalistic interpretation of Hume’s philosophy.
 At first glance, Professor Beebee’s view on Hume’s inductive scepticism seems to sympathize with the cur-
rently dominant, naturalistic interpretation of Hume, because she regards the status of scepticism as something 
to be abandoned. She says about sceptical arguments, “they are positively pernicious, in promoting philosophical 
principles.” Rather, she emphasizes Hume’s negative attitude towards sceptical arguments by finally concluding 
that; “his view would be that they should be consigned to the flames too.” As far as her denial of scepticism is 
concerned, her standpoint sounds to have close affinity with the currently dominant, naturalistic interpretation, 
as the naturalistic interpretation arose from diminishing the significance of scepticism in Hume’s philosophy. 
However, if I am not mistaken, Professor Beebee’s argument seems to go beyond this. As I argued before, 
naturalism, whether Humean one or Quinean one, is supposed to simply focus upon the issue about how our 
knowledge or belief is generated from a descriptive point of view. But, Professor Beebee seems to draw a kind 
of normative implication （rather than descriptive analysis） from Hume’s argument. What makes me think so is 
a part of her concluding remarks with negatively evaluating the significance of scepticism. She says, sceptical 
Beebee on Hume’s inductive scepticism
Ichinose Masaki
International Web Meeting
国際哲学研究 3 号 2014  223
arguments “have no practical application, and therefore conceiving philosophy itself as a discipline with no si-
gnificance for how we should live our lives.” This is quite unique, as, as far as I understand, Professor Beebee 
clearly supposes that Hume’s argument on causal reasoning could be a kind of guide, or more radically spea-
king, a kind of norm, which teaches us how we should live our lives. To be honest, however, I was wondering 
how we could understand Professor Beebee’s reading of Hume. At least, I would like to raise two questions.
 First, I am curious to know what Professor Beebee exactly means by “practical application.” For instance, 
according to Hume’s argument, we reach causal judgement between flame and heat in terms of our experience 
of constant conjunction between those two sorts of phenomena.  Of course, it is undoubtedly true that this cau-
sal knowledge is useful for us to lead comfortable lives when we treat something related to those like candles. 
But, this usefulness can make sense only if we put comfort or happiness as a kind of standard or norm that we 
ought to achieve in our lives. This putting some value as a norm is conceptually independent of our acquiring 
causal knowledge in an empirical way. It is one thing to understand causal relation between phenomena, and 
it is another thing to have some value as our goal. Actually, causal knowledge can be used in various ways, 
depending on goals we select. Please remember cases of war or firefighters, where causal knowledge would be 
used in a different way from the case we simply avoid burn. This fact suggests that causal knowledge itself has 
no practical significance without accepting practical value in advance. In fact, as long as we interpret Hume’s 
argument as a kind of naturalism rather than scepticism, we must be very careful to make distinction between 
descriptivity and normativity, in accordance with the sense of the concept, “naturalism.”
 Second, I would like to raise another question from a completely different, or perhaps opposite, angle from the 
previous paragraph. Professor Beebee emphasizes repeatedly that Hume’s arguments on causal reasoning are 
proposed from a psychological point of view rather than epistemological viewpoints where justification matters. 
I entirely agree with her, and this understanding evidently fits in well with popular reading of Hume as a na-
turalist. However, conversely, this very point makes me feel a bit unsatisfied with Hume’s arguments. What I 
want to raise here is that causal relations are sometimes applied in our society not so much psychologically as 
realistically or objectively. A typical case is that we ascribe criminal or moral responsibility to someone at the 
basis of causal relation between harm victims suffered and behaviours offenders conducted. If this causal rela-
tion is just a psychological one, our social system sounds to be too weak, or （much worse） arbitrary or variable 
depending on who judges, to be acceptable as a public treatment. Our commonsense tells that causal relation 
to support the judgement of the court must be as objectively founded as possible, otherwise it might be unjust. 
At least, if Hume takes causal relation to be just psychological, he should offer additional explanation about how 
those psychological phenomena could be the basis of our real society.
 Next, I would like to take the issue of a priori knowledge. Professor Beebee says, “Hume thinks that he has 
already explained the origin of a priori knowledge, through his account of reasoning concerning ‘relations of 
ideas’ （pp.8-9）.” As to this point, I would like to ask my longtime question. As his argument in ‘Of scepticism 
with regard to reason’ suggests, Hume seems to understand our mathematical calculation or reasoning as our 
mental process temporally occurring. If this is the case, I think that even mathematical reasoning should be 
absorbed into a category of causal relations in the context of Hume’s philosophy. Then, a question arises. Does 
Hume really and consistently maintain what is called ‘Hume’s fork’ （i.e. the distinction between ‘matters of 
fact’ and ‘relations of ideas’） or finally abolish （rather than polish） the fork? I am quite interested in how Pro-
fessor Beebee understands this point based on her unique, normativity interpretation of Hume.
